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LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS: A 
VIOLATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
Henry Hill was convicted of aiding and abetting first degree murder in 
connection with events that transpired when he was sixteen years old.1  Despite 
having already left the scene when the murder occurred and being evaluated to 
have the academic ability and mental maturity of a nine year old, Henry was 
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.2  Emily F. was 
convicted of murdering her aunt, an event that occurred when she was fifteen 
years old.3  Emily told her doctor several times prior to the murder that she was 
having violent hallucinations triggered by a prescription antidepressant.4  
Although Emily’s psychiatrist testified that Emily “did not know the difference 
between right and wrong and was incapable of understanding the nature of her 
acts . . . because she was in a psychotic state,” Emily was also sentenced to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.5 
Henry Hill and Emily F. are two of the more than 2,000 individuals in the 
United States currently serving sentences of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole for crimes they committed as children.6  Only about 12 
juvenile offenders are serving the same sentence in the rest of the world 
combined.7  In addition to being rarely applied in other countries, the sentence 
of life without parole for juvenile offenders is expressly prohibited by the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).8 
 
 1. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MICHIGAN, SECOND CHANCES:  JUVENILES 
SERVING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN MICHIGAN PRISONS 4 (2004), available at 
http://www.aclumich.org/pubs/juvenilelifers.pdf [hereinafter SECOND CHANCES]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. AMNESTY INT’L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 43 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/ 
reports/2005/us1005/TheRestofTheirLives.pdf [hereinafter THE REST OF THEIR LIVES]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 44 (quoting Iowa v. Fetters, 562 N.W.2d 770, 772, 774 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 6. Id. at 52. 
 7. Id. at 106. 
 8. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(a), opened for signature 
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC]. 
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Recently, there has been increased discussion about juvenile crime and 
punishment in general, and the imposition of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole in particular.  Indeed, following the United States 
Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons, holding unconstitutional 
the application of the death penalty to juvenile offenders, 9 some commentators 
have suggested that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is 
unconstitutional as well.10  Based on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, 
though, a constitutional challenge to such a sentence is unlikely to be 
successful even after Simmons.11 
However, the imposition of such sentences may be prohibited by 
international law.12  Based on the near-universal rejection of life without parole 
 
 9. 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). 
 10. Elizabeth Cepparulo, Roper v. Simmons: Unveiling Juvenile Purgatory—Is Life Really 
Better than Death?, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 225 (2006); Hillary J. Massey, Disposing 
of Children: The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile Life without Parole after Roper, 47 B.C. L. 
REV. 1083 (2006); Dirk van Zyl Smit, The Abolition of Capital Punishment for Persons under the 
Age of Eighteen Years in the United States of America.  What Next?, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 393, 
400 (2005) (“The recognition that was given to the diminished culpability of juveniles in 
[Simmons] may in due course give rise to the re-evaluation of the proportionality of sentences of 
life without parole for juveniles.”). 
  Further, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Simmons acknowledged that aspects of the 
majority’s reasoning would render life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders 
unconstitutional as well: 
It is also worth noting that, in addition to barring the execution of under-18 offenders, the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child prohibits punishing them with life 
in prison without the possibility of release.  If we are truly going to get in line with the 
international community, then the Court’s reassurance that the death penalty is really not 
needed, since “the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is 
itself a severe sanction” . . . gives little comfort. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. at 623 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 11. In holding that the juvenile death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Simmons Court found that the “objective indicia of 
consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the 
question” provided evidence of a “national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles.”  
Simmons, 543 U.S. at 564.  Because forty-two states allow life without parole sentences for 
juvenile offenders, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 3, at 25, the “national consensus” 
against the sentence is probably insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment challenge to it.  For 
federal decisions upholding challenges to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 
juveniles before Simmons, see Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
526 U.S. 1160 (1999); Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 1996).  But see Cepparulo, 
supra note 10 (arguing that life without parole for juvenile offenders violates Eighth 
Amendment); Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment:  Imposing Life without Parole 
on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681 (1998) (same); Massey, supra note 10 (same). 
 12. Vincent G. Levy argues that life imprisonment of juveniles violates international law for 
four reasons: (1) the procedures accorded juvenile offenders in the United States do not comply 
with the special procedures required by international agreements; (2) the sentence violates the 
CRC; (3) the sentence fails to emphasize rehabilitation or reintegration, in violation of 
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for youth offenders in other nations and the express prohibition of it in the 
CRC, the prohibition on life imprisonment without the possibility of release for 
juvenile offenders has become a matter of customary international law, and is 
binding on the United States.13 
Part I of this Comment defines customary international law and identifies 
relevant disagreements over what counts as evidence of customary 
international law.  Part II argues that the prohibition on life imprisonment of 
minors without the possibility of parole has become a rule of customary 
international law.  Part III argues that this rule is binding on the United States, 
and life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders are invalid under 
international law. 
I.  CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN GENERAL 
A. Definition of Customary International Law 
Customary international law is generally recognized as a source of 
international law independent of treaties.14  Therefore, if customary 
international law prohibits the imposition of life without parole sentences on 
juvenile offenders, “it might impose a legal obligation on the United States to 
eliminate this practice even if the United States is not obligated to do so by 
treaty.”15  Given the fact that customary international law imposes legal 
obligations on the United States, it is important to determine what customary 
international law is and how the existence of a customary norm is established. 
Customary international law is commonly defined as “international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice as accepted as law.”16  The 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States articulates 
that “[c]ustomary international law results from a general and consistent 
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”17  Under 
 
international agreements; and (4) life without parole sentences are per se disproportionate when 
imposed on juveniles. Vincent G. Levy, Enforcing International Norms in the United States after 
Roper v. Simmons: The Case of Juvenile Offenders Sentenced to Life without Parole, 45 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 262, 269–81 (2007). 
 13. See id. at 273–77 (arguing that Article 37(a) of the CRC has crystallized into a norm of 
customary international law). 
 14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 
(1987); see also Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38 § 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1031 (establishing international custom, international conventions, and the “general principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations” as types of international law). 
 15. Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 
485, 514 (2002) (discussing customary international law and the juvenile death penalty). 
 16. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38 § 1 cl. b; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (6th ed. 2003). 
 17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2). 
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these formulations, customary international law has two elements: an objective 
element of general or consistent state practice, and a subjective element of 
acceptance as law or a sense of legal obligation.18  This subjective element is 
called “opinio juris et necessitatis” or “opinio juris.”19  Although the definition 
of customary international law is relatively straightforward, there is much 
disagreement over how to define and determine consistent state practice and 
opinio juris. 
B. State Practice 
For the prohibition on life without parole for juvenile offenders to be a 
matter of customary international law, the norm must satisfy the first element 
of customary international law: consistent state practice.20  There is 
considerable disagreement over the levels of uniformity, consistency, and 
generality required for state practice and the types of evidence that can be used 
to establish it.  Although the Permanent Court of International Justice has 
declared the practices of fewer than a dozen states to be matters of customary 
international law, a very large majority of states must at least acquiesce in the 
practice to satisfy the consistent practice requirement.21  Some scholars argue 
that state practice must be completely uniform for the practice to qualify as a 
norm of customary international law.22  However, Ian Brownlie indicates that 
“substantial uniformity,” as opposed to “complete uniformity,” is required.23  
Further, Jordan Paust argues that even violations of a norm of customary 
international law do not undermine the state practice requirement, provided 
that the violations do not become too widespread.24 
In addition to disagreement over the level of generality and uniformity 
required for state practice, there is debate over the types of evidence that can 
be used to show state practice.  Some commentators argue for a broad range of 
 
 18. Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 
123 (2006). 
 19. BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 8. 
 20. Guzman, supra note 18, at 123. 
 21. Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 6–7 (1988). 
 22. See, e.g., Arthur M. Weisburd, The Effect of Treaties and Other Formal International 
Acts on the Customary Law of Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 103 (1995–1996) 
(“[I]n order to be able to properly characterize a norm as a rule of customary international law, it 
must be true either that states very seldom violate the norm—such that the question of 
enforcement does not arise—or that the international legal system is prepared to employ its 
characteristic means of coercion in response to violations of the norm.”). 
 23. BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 7; see also Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature, Sources 
and Evidences of Customary Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 147, 151 (1995–1996) 
(arguing that state practice “need only be general, not uniform”). 
 24. Paust, supra note 23. 
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acceptable evidence.  For example, Brownlie identifies the following as 
material sources of custom: 
diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions of 
official legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions, e.g. manuals of 
military law, executive decisions and practices, orders to naval forces etc., 
comments by governments on drafts produced by the International Law 
Commission, state legislation, international and national judicial decisions, 
recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in 
the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to 
legal questions in the United Nations General Assembly.25 
In contrast, other commentators argue that only physical acts of states should 
be considered.26  United States courts have considered judicial opinions, the 
works of text writers, treaties and other international agreements, domestic 
constitutions or legislation, executive orders, declarations or recognitions, draft 
conventions or codes, reports, and resolutions of international organizations in 
evaluating customary norms.27 
The issue of whether resolutions of international bodies, like the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights, qualify as evidence of state practice is 
of particular relevance to the determination of whether life without parole 
sentences for juvenile offenders are prohibited by customary international law.  
While the United States Department of State considers government acts like 
treaties, executive agreements, federal regulations, federal court decisions, and 
internal memoranda to be evidence of state practice, it excludes from 
acceptable evidence resolutions of international bodies.28  In contrast, several 
prominent theorists consider such resolutions to be permissible evidence of 
state practice.  For example, Brownlie argues that when resolutions are 
concerned with general norms of international law, they constitute evidence of 
state opinion.29 
 
 25. BROWNLIE, supra note 16 (internal citations omitted). 
 26. See Guzman, supra note 18, at 126. 
 27. JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 3–4 (1996). 
 28. Guzman, supra note 18, at 126.  But see PAUST, supra note 27 (including “resolutions or 
decisions of international organizations” in a list of types of evidence United States courts have 
considered). 
 29. BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 14–15.  Brownlie explains: 
In general these resolutions are not binding on member states, but, when they are 
concerned with general norms of international law, then acceptance by a majority vote 
constitutes evidence of the opinions of governments in the widest forum for the 
expression of such opinions.  Even when they are framed as general principles, 
resolutions of this kind provide a basis for the progressive development of the law and the 
speedy consolidation of customary rules. 
Id. 
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Like resolutions of international bodies, the issue of whether multilateral 
human rights treaties constitute permissible evidence of state practice is 
particularly relevant to the status of the prohibition on life imprisonment of 
juvenile offenders as a rule of customary international law.  R.R. Baxter 
proposes that treaties which on their face purport to be declaratory of 
customary international law should be accepted as legitimate evidence of state 
practice, and should carry a weight proportionate to the number of nations 
made party to the treaty.30  Anthony D’Amato considers a treaty to be a “clear 
record of a binding international commitment that constitutes the ‘practice of 
states’ and hence is as much a record of customary behavior as any other state 
act or restraint.”31  In contrast, Arthur M. Weisburd argues that even treaties 
that are declarative of custom at the time of their adoption do not provide 
evidence of consistent state practice because developments in actual state 
practice can result in customary law diverging from the law declared in the 
treaty.32  As previously noted, the United States Department of State considers 
treaties to be acceptable evidence of state practice.33 
A final issue relevant to the determination of whether customary 
international law prohibits sentencing juvenile offenders to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole is whether a consistent pattern of non-action 
can satisfy the state practice requirement.  D’Amato distinguishes between two 
types of non-acts: failure to act because of discretion and failure to act because 
of legal obligation.34  He argues that only the second type of non-acts provides 
permissible evidence of state practice.  That is, “a state’s failure to act when it 
has been given notice . . . that states have a duty to refrain from acting . . . is 
the only kind of non-act that can contribute to the formation of customary 
international law.”35  A treaty obligation can provide the requisite duty to 
refrain from action, and therefore non-action under a treaty obligation provides 
unambiguous evidence of state practice.36 
Clearly, there is much debate surrounding the meaning of and permissible 
evidence of the state practice element of customary international law.  In the 
context of life imprisonment of minors, however, this element is satisfied even 
 
 30. R.R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, 41 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 275, 298 (1965–1966). 
 31. ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 104 
(1971). 
 32. Weisburd, supra note 21, at 11, 20. 
 33. Guzman, supra note 18, at 126. 
 34. D’AMATO, supra note 31, at 62. 
 35. Id. at 82. 
 36. Id. at 162 (“Omissions of states—failures to act—are more ambiguous than treaties 
which prohibit certain actions.  The treaty speaks with clarity that a state has agreed to abstain 
from an action, whereas mere abstention without a treaty does not necessarily mean that states 
feel a duty to abstain.”). 
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under the most restrictive view of state practice.  As Part II, infra, will 
illustrate, while dispute over the validity of resolutions and multilateral treaties 
as evidence of state practice is relevant to the status of life without parole 
sentences for juvenile offenders, the acts of states prohibiting or abstaining 
from the imposition of such sentences is probably sufficient to satisfy the state 
practice element independently of resolutions or treaties. 
C. Opinio Juris 
For the prohibition on life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders 
to be a rule of customary international law, the norm must also satisfy a second 
element, the subjective requirement of opinio juris.37  This element requires 
that states follow a practice from a sense of legal obligation.38  According to 
the International Court of Justice, opinio juris requires that “the acts 
concerned . . . be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a 
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law 
requiring it.”39  Accordingly, a practice that is generally followed, but that 
states feel legally free to disregard, is not part of customary international law.40 
Just as with the state practice element of customary international law, there 
is disagreement over what qualifies as evidence of opinio juris.  With respect 
to whether the opinio juris element is satisfied for a norm prohibiting life 
imprisonment without the possibility of release for juvenile offenders, the most 
 
 37. Guzman, supra note 18.  Some scholars do not consider opinio juris to be a requirement 
for the development of customary international law.  See BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 8 n.30.  
However, the prevailing view is that the subjective requirement of opinio juris is necessary 
because there is a distinction between obligation and usage in state practice.  Id. at 8.  Legal 
obligation gives rise to customary international law, while “motives of courtesy, fairness, or 
morality” merely give rise to usage.  Id. 
  Goldsmith and Posner reject the concept of opinio juris altogether.  Jack L. Goldsmith & 
Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999).  
Applying game theory concepts, they argue that international behavior is a function of national 
self-interest, not a sense of legal obligation.  Id. at 1120.  They are “skeptical of the existence of 
multilateral behavioral regularities that are typically thought to constitute [customary 
international law].”  Id. at 1115.  Goldsmith and Posner’s rejection of traditional conceptions of 
customary international law has been widely criticized.  See, e.g., Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory 
and Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 143 (2001), so this paper will focus on the prevailing view that opinio juris exists and is 
an element of customary international law. 
 38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 
cmt. c (1987); see also North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 
3, 44 (Feb. 20) (“The States concerned must . . . feel that they are conforming to what amounts to 
a legal obligation.”). 
 39. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 44. 
 40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 
cmt. c. 
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important theoretical debate is that over whether multilateral treaties provide 
evidence of the requisite sense of legal obligation. 
Weisburd advances a strict view of opinio juris and rejects the idea that 
treaties provide evidence of it.  He argues that the only way to determine 
whether states see a particular rule as legally binding is to determine their 
belief as to the consequences of breaching the rule.41  That is, the state must 
“acknowledge . . . the right of states to whom it owes a putative duty to inquire 
about possible breaches of the duty and also acknowledge . . . its obligation to 
make reparation for any breaches of duty.”42 
Under this strict view, Weisburd argues that opinio juris requires that state 
practice be informed by a sense of legal obligation under international law 
separate from treaty commitments.43  He writes, “it is easy to imagine 
circumstances in which a particular treaty not only fails to express opinio juris, 
but actually denies opinio juris, that is, provides evidence that the parties 
would reject any duty to behave as the treaty required had the treaty not been 
concluded.”44  For example, treaties that impose obligations on states but either 
expressly or impliedly limit the right of parties to inquire into possible 
breaches and circumscribe legal remedies for breaches of the treaty obligations 
do not provide evidence of a sense of legal obligation.45  Indeed, such treaties 
“seem to deny opinio juris.”46 
While Weisburd and others argue that treaties are not legitimate evidence 
of opinio juris, other scholars consider treaties to be sufficient evidence, and 
indeed, to generate norms of customary international law.  After analyzing 
judicial decisions of the International Court of Justice and other international 
courts,47 examples from state practice,48 the opinions of scholars,49 and 
 
 41. Weisburd, supra note 21, at 9. 
 42. Id. at 23. 
 43. Id. at 24.  See also Bradley, supra note 15, at 514–15 (“It is unclear, however, whether 
the nations that have abolished the juvenile death penalty have done so out of a sense of legal 
obligation, or at least a sense of legal obligation that is separate from their various treaty 
commitments.”). 
 44. Weisburd, supra note 21, at 24. 
 45. Id. at 25–26. 
 46. Id. at 29.  For example, Weisburd argues that the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (CCPR) denies opinio juris.  Id. at 26–29.  He claims that the CCPR limits the 
rights of parties to examine other parties’ conduct and provides no enforcement mechanism or 
prescriptive power to the Human Rights Committee it establishes.  Id. at 26.  He concludes that 
the CCPR denies opinio juris because it limits the rights of parties to investigate breaches of 
obligations in the treaty and precludes any duty of the parties to make good to any entity 
violations of the treaty.  Id. at 29. 
 47. D’AMATO, supra note 31, at 113–28.  D’Amato summarizes, “national and international 
courts have realized that treaties, far from being irrelevant to the content of international law, in 
fact are the records of state acts and commitments that continually shape, change, and refine the 
content of customary international law.”  Id. at 128. 
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theoretical considerations,50 D’Amato concludes that treaties supply the best 
evidence of the sense of legal obligation required for opinio juris.51  He writes, 
“[n]early all the substantive provisions in multilateral conventions contain 
formulations of norms of international law that meet all the requirements of 
articulation.”52 
Brownlie also considers certain types of treaties as constituting evidence of 
opinio juris.  “Law-making” treaties are those treaties that “create general 
norms for the future conduct of the parties in terms of legal propositions, and 
the obligations are basically the same for all parties.”53  Although law-making 
treaties are in principle binding only on parties, “the number of parties, the 
explicit acceptance of rules of law, and, in some cases, the declaratory nature 
of the provisions produce a strong law-creating effect at least as great as the 
general practice considered sufficient to support a customary rule.”54  Brownlie 
discusses the International Court of Justice’s reasoning in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases as an example of treaty obligations providing evidence 
of customary international law.55  In those cases, the Court concluded that 
three articles of a relevant treaty had crystallized into rules of customary 
international law because they stated emergent or pre-existing customary law, 
showing that international covenants may provide evidence of a sense of legal 
obligation.56 
 
 48. Id. at 128–38. 
 49. Id. at 138–49. 
 50. Id. at 149–66. 
 51. Id. at 160. 
 52. D’AMATO, supra note 31, at 160–61 (emphasis omitted).  D’Amato argues that treaties 
go beyond merely providing evidence of opinio juris.  He finds that treaties “themselves 
constitute or generate customary rules of law.”  Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Human 
Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L REV. 1110, 1129 (1982).  Limiting his discussion to 
genocide, torture, and slavery, he argues that multilateral conventions containing prohibitions on 
these practices “constitute evidence of customary law binding upon all states and not just the 
parties thereto.”  Id.  No evidence apart from the conventions is required to establish the 
prohibitions as rules of customary international law.  Id.  The passage of time, or a “harden[ing]” 
process, is also unnecessary.  D’AMATO, supra note 31, at 162–63.   While D’Amato agrees that a 
treaty that has been in existence for a longer period is more persuasive evidence of custom, 
treaties generate customary international law at the moment of ratification.  Id. at 163–64. 
 53. BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 12.  Although Brownlie does not mention the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child specifically, he does indicate that instruments like 
the Genocide Convention of 1948 and parts of the United Nations Charter are law-making 
treaties.  Id. at 12–13. 
 54. Id. at 13. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id.  Brownlie questions the aspect of the International Court of Justice’s reasoning 
that distinguishes among treaty articles based on the ability of states to make unilateral 
reservations to them: “With respect it may be doubted if the existence of reservations of itself 
destroys the probative value of treaty provisions.”  Id. 
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Clearly, there is intense debate over the status of treaties as evidence of 
opinio juris.  The views of scholars like D’Amato and Brownlie, accepting 
treaty obligations as competent evidence of opinio juris, are more persuasive 
than the views of scholars like Weisburd, requiring a sense of legal obligation 
separate from treaty obligations.  The basis of Weisburd’s rejection of treaties 
as evidence of opinio juris is his focus on state-to-state remedies.  While it may 
be true that multilateral human rights treaties do not always create state-to-state 
remedies, many scholars recognize that the process of sanctioning human 
rights violations involves more than just formal state-to-state action.57  Private 
institutions, groups, and individuals also enforce the obligation of states not to 
violate human rights through diplomatic, ideologic, and economic strategies.58 
Further, the primary obligation under human rights treaties is not to other 
states, but rather to individuals.59  For example, in contrast to Weisburd’s 
assertion that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) 
denies opinio juris by limiting the rights of parties to examine other parties’ 
conduct and by providing no enforcement mechanism,60 this treaty actually 
does impose an obligation on states to provide a remedy for violations.  Article 
2 requires each state party to “ensure that any person whose rights or 
freedoms . . . are violated shall have an effective remedy.”61 
Finally, Weisburd’s reasoning that if a treaty does not explicitly provide a 
remedy it does not create an individual right and a corresponding legal 
obligation for the state is flawed.62  His argument confuses primary and 
remedial law.63  The fact that a treaty does not create a private right of action 
against the state—that is, a remedy—does not mean that the treaty fails to 
create rights.64  Individual treaty rights impose a legal obligation on states to 
comply with the treaty.  Therefore, despite Weisburd’s assertion that a treaty 
obligation alone is insufficient to express opinio juris, the nature of multilateral 
human rights treaties is such that their ratification creates strong evidence of 
it.65 
 
 57. Paust, supra note 23, at 159–60. 
 58. Id. at 160–61. 
 59. Id. at 161. 
 60. See Weisburd, supra note 21, at 29. 
 61. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(3), Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. 
DOC. C, D, E, F, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter CCPR]. 
 62. See David Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights?  The 
Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
20, 36–37 (2006) (arguing that if a treaty provides for individual rights, then an individual whose 
rights have been violated is entitled to a remedy). 
 63. See id. at 29–31 (explaining primary and remedial law). 
 64. See id. at 34. 
 65. See Baxter, supra note 30, at 299 (emphasizing the special character of humanitarian 
treaties). 
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D. Persistent Objector Doctrine 
If the prohibition on life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders 
satisfies both the state practice and opinio juris elements of customary 
international law, it is binding on all states, even those whose practices are not 
in line with the norm.66  The only exception to this rule is the persistent 
objector doctrine, the “widely accepted” notion “that nations that persistently 
object to a customary international norm while it is being developed are not 
bound by the norm.”67  While the persistent objector doctrine is not completely 
uncontroversial, it is “as close to a settled proposition as one can find in 
international law.”68  Indeed, the International Court of Justice and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights have accepted it.69  The Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States also adopts the doctrine: 
Although customary law may be built by the acquiescence as well as by the 
actions of states . . . and become generally binding on all states, in principle a 
state that indicates its dissent from a practice while the law is still in the 
process of development is not bound by that rule even after it matures.70 
Therefore, if the United States were to meet the requirements of the persistent 
objector doctrine, it would not be bound by the rule of customary international 
law prohibiting life imprisonment without the possibility of release for juvenile 
offenders. 
To be considered a persistent objector and be permitted to opt out of a 
customary rule, a state must meet two conditions: “[f]irst, the state must object 
when the rule is in its nascent stage, and continue to object afterwards;” and 
second, the state’s objection must be consistent.71  Lynn Loschin suggests a 
useful analytical model to determine whether an objecting state should be 
permitted to opt out of a norm of customary international law as a persistent 
objector.  This model, which will be discussed in detail in Part III, infra, 
analyzes whether a state is bound by a treaty or a peremptory norm and 
balances the nature of the norm with the nature of the objection.72 
Applying this model to the (purported) rule of customary international law 
prohibiting the application of the death penalty to juvenile offenders before 
Roper v. Simmons, Loschin concluded that the United States’ objection to that 
 
 66. Bradley, supra note 15; see Lynn Loschin, The Persistent Objector and Customary 
Human Rights Law: A Proposed Analytical Framework, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 147, 
149 (1996). 
 67. Bradley, supra note 15, at 516. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 
cmt. d (1987). 
 71. Loschin, supra note 66, at 150–51. 
 72. Id. at 161–68. 
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norm did not meet the requirements of persistent objection.73  In contrast, 
Bradley argued that the United States had reached persistent objector status 
with respect to this norm.  He outlined a history of United States objection to 
prohibitions on the death penalty and the juvenile death penalty, and concluded 
that: 
at least since the late 1970s, the United States has declined to agree to treaty 
provisions that would outlaw the execution of juvenile offenders, has 
repeatedly stated before international bodies (such as the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights and the ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee) 
that it objects to an international law ban on the practice, and has continued to 
allow for the execution of juvenile offenders domestically in the face of 
international pressure to end the practice.74 
The history of the United States’ objection to prohibitions on the juvenile death 
penalty will illuminate the failure of the United States to object to the 
prohibition on life imprisonment of minors. 
II.  PROHIBITION ON LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS IS A 
RULE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Given the permissible and relevant evidence of state practice and opinio 
juris, customary international law prohibits the imposition of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole on juvenile offenders.  This sentence is widely 
imposed in the United States, with at least 2,225 youth offenders serving life 
without parole sentences in 2004,75 but rarely imposed in the rest of the world, 
with only 9 to 12 youth offenders serving such sentences in other countries.76  
The sentence is expressly prohibited by the CRC,77 a treaty to which 192 states 
are parties.78  The widespread state practice of prohibiting life without parole 
for minors, the CRC’s rejection of this sentence, and the history and 
acceptance of the CRC show that the prohibition of such sentences for juvenile 
offenders has become a matter of customary international law, and as such, is 
binding on the United States. 
 
 73. Id. at 171. 
 74. Bradley, supra note 15, at 520–35. 
 75. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 3, at 25. 
 76. Id. at 106.  Human Rights Watch obtained data relating to international practice by 
examining the reports of 166 countries to the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the 
Child.  For the 53 states that failed to report to the Committee on their practices under Article 37, 
Human Rights Watch reviewed articles covering recent sentencing decisions and interviewed the 
UNICEF Child Protection Officer in the state, criminal defense attorneys, judges, criminal justice 
nongovernmental organizations, and the press.  Id. at 105 n.312. 
 77. CRC, supra note 8. 
 78. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 3, at 99. 
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A. State Practice 
The first element of customary international law is an objective one: 
general and consistent state practice.79  This requirement is satisfied for the 
norm prohibiting life without parole for juvenile offenders, as evidenced by the 
small number of states that currently have youth offenders serving such 
sentences, the limited number of states whose penal codes allow for such 
sentences, and the great number of states whose penal codes expressly prohibit 
such sentences.  A widely ratified treaty and statements by international bodies 
condemning life without parole for youth offenders provide additional 
evidence of state practice. 
In stark contrast to the United States, almost all other countries in the 
world avoid sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole.  Based on a 
review of state reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child and, when 
necessary, interviews with governmental and non-governmental 
organizations,80 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch determined 
that only four states currently have youth offenders serving life sentences 
without the possibility of parole.81  South Africa has four juvenile offenders, 
Tanzania has one, Israel has between four and seven, and the United States has 
over two thousand.82 
Among states that currently do not have juvenile offenders serving life 
without parole sentences, only about twenty provide for this sentence in their 
penal codes.  Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch report that the 
penal codes of Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cuba, 
 
 79. Guzman, supra note 18, at 123. 
 80. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 3, at 105 n.312. 
 81. Id. at 106.  Human Rights Watch was able to obtain data on state practice regarding life 
imprisonment of juvenile offenders for 154 states.  Id. at 104–05.  Although there may be a 
danger that states did not accurately report the number of juvenile offenders serving life without 
parole sentences, this danger is reduced by the fact that the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
reviewed the reports and considered the independent reports of nongovernmental organizations.  
See CRC, supra note 8, art. 45. 
  Further, any state that did misrepresent the status of juvenile offenders in its justice 
system may have done so because it knew that life without parole sentences for such offenders 
violated its international legal obligations, providing additional evidence of state practice and 
opinio juris.  Cf. Lisa L. Hajjar, Torture and the Future, GLOBAL & INT’L STUDIES PROGRAM, 
U.C. SANTA BARBARA (Oct. 1, 2004), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/gis/5/ (arguing 
that states deny engaging in torture because torture is forbidden under international law). 
  Overall, even if the numbers contained in the Amnesty International/Human Rights 
Watch report and in this paper are not exact, they were obtained through the best efforts of 
researchers and Committee on the Rights of the Child members.  The number of states that refrain 
from sentencing juveniles to life without parole is so high that the state practice element of 
customary international law would be satisfied even if the number of states that do sentence 
juveniles is higher than four. 
 82. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 3, at 25, 106. 
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Dominica, Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands, and Sri 
Lanka technically allow life imprisonment without the possibility of release for 
child offenders.83  Additionally, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has 
expressed concern that the laws of the following states theoretically allow life 
imprisonment for juvenile offenders, even if such sentences are not imposed in 
practice:84 Bangladesh (children over seven),85 Belgium (children sixteen to 
eighteen),86 Belize (children over nine),87 China,88 Japan,89 Liberia (children 
sixteen to eighteen),90 and the Netherlands and Aruba (children sixteen to 
eighteen).91  In many of these states, it is unclear whether juvenile offenders 
sentenced to life imprisonment are ever eligible for parole or release.92  
Further, the sentence is rarely used in most of these countries.93 
The penal codes of the remaining states either do not provide for life 
imprisonment of juvenile offenders or expressly prohibit this sentence.94  The 
 
 83. Id. at 106–07. 
 84. For a compilation of concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, organized by state and article under consideration, see CYNTHIA PRICE COHEN, 
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD (2005). 
 85. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
under Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Observations: Bangladesh, ¶ 77(b), U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.221 (Oct. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Bangladesh]. 
 86. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child: Belgium, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.38 (June 20, 1995) [hereinafter Belgium]. 
 87. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
under Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Observations: Belize, ¶ 70, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.252 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
 88. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
under Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Observations: China (including Hong Kong and 
Macau Special Administrative Regions), ¶ 89, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/CHN/CO/2 (Nov. 24, 2005). 
 89. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child: Japan, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.231 (Feb. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Japan]. 
 90. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
under Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Observations: Liberia, ¶ 66, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.236 (July 1, 2004) [hereinafter Liberia]. 
 91. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
under Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Observations: The Kingdom of the Netherlands 
(Netherlands and Aruba), ¶¶ 58–59, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.227 (Feb. 26, 2004) [hereinafter 
Netherlands and Aruba]. 
 92. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 3, at 106–07.  The Committee on the Rights of 
the Child does not specify whether the penal codes of Bangladesh, Belgium, Japan, or the 
Netherlands and Aruba allow for the possibility of parole for life sentences.  Bangladesh, supra 
note 85; Belgium, supra note 86; Japan, supra note 89; Netherlands and Aruba, supra note 91. 
 93. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 3, at 106–07. 
 94. Although an express legal prohibition on life without parole for juvenile offenders 
provides the most compelling evidence of state practice, the silence of a penal code with respect 
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Federal Republic of Germany’s Juvenile Justice Act does not allow persons 
under eighteen to be sentenced to life imprisonment, with or without parole.95  
Austria, Ireland, Switzerland, and Sweden also prohibit life without parole for 
juvenile offenders.96  Additionally, at least twenty-nine African countries 
prohibit life without parole for juveniles under the age of eighteen,97 and seven 
other African countries prohibit the sentence for juveniles under sixteen.98  The 
United Kingdom forbids “imprisonment for life” for juvenile offenders 
convicted of murder, but allows detention “for the duration of Her Majesty’s 
pleasure.”99  In Hussain v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human 
Rights held that juveniles sentenced to imprisonment “during Her Majesty’s 
pleasure” were entitled to review by a parole board after they served a certain 
 
to this sentence also provides persuasive evidence.  The fact that a state has not contemplated life 
without parole for juvenile offenders in its legislation may indicate that it would never consider 
imposing this sentence.  Indeed, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has rarely expressed 
concern that the failure of a state’s penal code to expressly prohibit life imprisonment for juvenile 
offenders may allow such sentences to be imposed.  The Committee did express this concern in 
its observations on Zimbabwe, Guatemala, and Trinidad and Tobago.  Comm. on the Rights of 
the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the 
Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Zimbabwe, ¶ 
21, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.55 (June 7, 1996) [hereinafter Zimbabwe]; Comm. on the Rights of 
the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the 
Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Guatemala, ¶ 
15, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.58 (June 7, 1996); Comm. on the Rights of the Child, 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by the States Parties under Article 44 of the Convention: 
Concluding Observations: Trinidad and Tobago, ¶ 73(b), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/TTO/CO/2 (Mar. 17, 
2006). 
 95. DIRK VAN ZYL SMIT, TAKING LIFE IMPRISONMENT SERIOUSLY IN NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 138 (2002). 
 96. SECOND CHANCES, supra note 1, at 21. 
 97. These countries are Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Togo, Tunisia, and Uganda.  THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, 
supra note 3, at 105 n.315.  Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also include Liberia 
and Zimbabwe in the list of African states that prohibit life without parole for all juvenile 
offenders.  Id.  As noted, the Committee on the Rights of the Child found that Liberia allows this 
sentence for sixteen and seventeen year old offenders.  Liberia, supra note 90.  The Committee 
also expressed concern that Zimbabwe’s penal code lacked a clear prohibition of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of release.  Zimbabwe, supra note 94. 
 98. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch list six of these countries: Comoros, 
Congo (Brazzaville), Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, and Senegal.  THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, 
supra note 3, at 105 n.316.  Liberia also prohibits life without parole for under-sixteen offenders.  
See Liberia, supra note 90. 
 99. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 3, at 107 n.324; VAN ZYL SMIT, supra note 95, at 
125 (quoting Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act of 1965). 
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number of years.100  That is, British law forbids life imprisonment without the 
possibility of release. 
Further, for many states, the prohibition on life without parole for juvenile 
offenders in Article 37(a) of the CRC101 is equivalent to a prohibition in their 
domestic codes.  These states “view a treaty as part of their internal law once it 
enters into force internationally.”102  In a survey of nineteen diverse states,103 
“[n]early two-thirds . . . consider treaties to operate directly as domestic law 
under certain circumstances.”104  Although an analysis of the interaction of 
treaty obligations and domestic law for all states is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, the number of surveyed states that consider treaty obligations to 
automatically have the effect of domestic law suggests that the domestic law of 
many states prohibits life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders as a 
result of their ratification of the CRC. 
The number of states that do not have juvenile offenders serving life 
without parole sentences and the number that do not provide for this offense in 
their penal codes provide sufficient evidence to satisfy the state practice 
requirement of customary international law.  As noted, a practice need not be 
universal to qualify as a general state practice.105  Because only 4 states 
currently have juvenile offenders serving sentences of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole and about 170 states do not allow for this 
sentence, there is substantial uniformity in state practice.  Further, the failure to 
sentence juvenile offenders to life without parole and the failure to allow for 
this sentence in penal codes is the type of non-action that qualifies as evidence 
of state practice.  Failure to act because of a legal obligation, like that imposed 
by a treaty, “is the only kind of non-act that can contribute to the formation of 
customary international law.”106  Because Article 37(a) of the CRC imposes a 
legal duty on states to ensure that life imprisonment without the possibility of 
release is not imposed on juvenile offenders, 107 the non-action of states in not 
imposing this sentence is permissible evidence of state practice. 
Although the action of states in prohibiting and refraining from sentencing 
juvenile offenders to life without parole is sufficient to satisfy the state practice 
 
 100. Hussain v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 23 (1996); VAN ZYL SMIT, supra note 
95, at 125. 
 101. CRC, supra note 8. 
 102. Duncan B. Hollis, A Comparative Approach to Treaty Law and Practice, in NATIONAL 
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 1, 40 (Duncan B. Hollis et al. eds., 2005). 
 103. The nineteen states are Austria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, France, 
Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, 
Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  Id. at 5. 
 104. Id. at 41. 
 105. See BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 7; Paust, supra note 23. 
 106. D’AMATO, supra note 31, at 82, 162. 
 107. CRC, supra note 8. 
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element, statements of international bodies and Article 37(a) of the CRC 
provide additional evidence of state practice.  The United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights has adopted several resolutions reaffirming that a prohibition 
on life without parole for juvenile offenders enjoys consistent state practice.  In 
2002 and 2004, the Commission adopted resolutions “urg[ing] States to ensure 
that under their legislation and practice neither capital punishment nor life 
imprisonment without the possibility of release shall be imposed for offences 
committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”108  In 2005, the 
Commission called upon all states to “ensure compliance with the principle 
that depriving children of their liberty should be used only as a measure of last 
resort and for the shortest appropriate time, in particular before trial, recalling 
the prohibition of life imprisonment without possibility of release.”109 
Further, in 2006, the Human Rights Committee reprimanded the United 
States for its practice of sentencing juvenile offenders to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of release in its concluding observations on the 
compliance of the United States with the CCPR: “The State party should 
ensure that no such child offender is sentenced to life imprisonment without 
parole, and should adopt all appropriate measures to review the situation of 
persons already serving such sentences.”110 
Finally, Article 37(a) of the CRC obligates state parties to ensure that life 
imprisonment without the possibility of release is not imposed on juvenile 
offenders.111  The fact that 192 states are parties to the CRC112 provides 
evidence of consistent state practice in prohibiting life without parole 
sentences for minors. 
 
 108. Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2004/43, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2004/43 (Apr. 
19, 2004); Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2002/47, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/47 (Apr. 
23, 2002) (emphasis omitted). 
 109. Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2005/44, ¶ 27(c), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/44 (Apr. 
19, 2005). 
 110. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under 
Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observation of the Human Rights Committee: United 
States of America, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3 (Sept. 15, 2006) (“The Committee notes 
with concern reports that forty-two states and the Federal government have laws allowing persons 
under the age of eighteen at the time the offence was committed, to receive life sentences, without 
parole, and that about 2,225 youth offenders are currently serving life sentences in United States 
prisons.  The Committee, while noting the State party’s reservation to treat juveniles as adults in 
exceptional circumstances notwithstanding articles 10(2)(b) and (3) and 14(4) of the Covenant, 
remains concerned by information that treatment of children as adults is not only applied in 
exceptional circumstances.  The Committee is of the view that sentencing children to life sentence 
without parole is of itself not in compliance with article 24(1) of the Covenant.”). 
 111. CRC, supra note 8. 
 112. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Report on the Forty-Second Session, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/42/3 (Nov. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Report on the Forty-Second Session]. 
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Although the resolutions adopted by the Commission on Human Rights, 
the statement issued by the Human Rights Committee, and the provision on life 
without parole in the CRC provide evidence of state action prohibiting life 
without parole for juvenile offenders, these expressions of opinion are not 
necessary to establish the state practice element of customary international law.  
The overwhelming number of states that do not have juvenile offenders serving 
life without parole sentences and that do not allow for or expressly prohibit 
such sentences provides sufficiently strong evidence to conclude that state 
practice has reached the level of uniformity, consistency, and generality to 
satisfy the first element of customary international law. 
B. Opinio Juris 
The second element of customary international law, opinio juris, requires 
that states must follow a practice from a sense of legal obligation.113  As 
discussed in Part I, supra, one of the most controversial aspects of opinio juris 
is what qualifies as evidence of it.  The opinio juris element of the norm 
prohibiting life without parole for juvenile offenders is most easily satisfied if 
one accepts the validity of treaties as evidence of it.  The prohibition on life 
without parole for juvenile offenders in the CRC, together with other 
provisions of that treaty, provides evidence that states refrain from imposing 
such sentences out of a sense of legal obligation.  In addition to the treaty 
provision itself, the drafting history of the CRC and the widespread ratification 
of it provide further evidence of opinio juris. 
Several international instruments implicate the issue of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of release for child offenders, including the CCPR114 
and the European Convention on Human Rights.115  These documents provide 
 
 113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 
cmt. c (1987). 
 114. CCPR, supra note 61.  The CCPR acknowledges the need for special treatment of 
children in the criminal justice system and emphasizes the importance of rehabilitation.  Article 
10(3) mandates the separation of youth offenders from adults, Article 14(4) provides that criminal 
procedures for children shall “take account of the age and the desirability of promoting their 
rehabilitation,” and Article 24(1) provides that each child shall have “right to such measures of 
protection as are required by his status as a minor.”  Id. art. 10(3), 14(4), 24(1). 
  The United Nations Human Rights Committee has stated that the practice of sentencing 
child offenders to life without parole “is of itself not in compliance with article 24(1) of the 
[CCPR].”  Human Rights Comm., supra note 110.  The Committee noted that the United States 
entered a reservation to treat juveniles as adults in exceptional circumstances, but remained 
“concerned by information that treatment of children as adults is not only applied in exceptional 
circumstances.”  Id.  To the extent the CCPR indirectly prohibits life without parole for minors, 
this prohibition remains binding on the United States despite its reservation. 
 115. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].  Under Article 3 of the ECHR, “[n]o one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”  Id. art. 3. 
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some evidence that states refrain from sentencing juvenile offenders to life 
without parole out of a sense of legal duty.  However, the CRC is the first 
international instrument to expressly prohibit this sentence,116 so it provides the 
strongest evidence of opinio juris. 
Article 37(a) of the CRC provides that state parties shall ensure that 
“[n]either capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of 
release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below eighteen 
years of age.”117  Article 37 also obligates states to ensure that the “arrest, 
detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and 
shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate 
period of time.”118  Clearly, the language of Article 37 of the CRC prohibits 
life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders.  Under a view accepting 
multinational treaties as evidence of opinio juris, the obligation of states under 
the CRC to ensure that such sentences are not imposed provides sufficient 
evidence of opinio juris to establish that this obligation is a matter of 
customary international law.119 
The view that treaties do not provide evidence of opinio juris is 
unpersuasive in the context of the CRC.  Despite Weisburd’s claim that treaties 
circumscribe legal remedies for breach of treaty obligations,120 the provisions 
of the CRC impose a legal obligation on state parties to respect and ensure the 
rights set forth in the Convention.  Article 2 provides that “States Parties shall 
take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all 
forms of discrimination,”121 and Article 4 provides that “State Parties shall 
undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the 
implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention.”122  These 
provisions show that the CRC does not circumscribe remedies; rather, it 
requires states to undertake “all” measures for the implementation and 
protection of rights mentioned in the Convention.  Further, the CRC expressly 
 
  The European Court of Human Rights intimated in Hussain v. the United Kingdom that 
life without parole for minors might violate this article: 
A failure to have regard to the changes that inevitably occur with maturation would mean 
that young persons detained under section 53 would be treated as having forfeited their 
liberty for the rest of their lives, a situation which . . . might give rise to questions under 
Article 3 . . . of the Convention. 
Hussain v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 25 (1996). 
 116. WILLIAM SCHABAS & HELMUT SAX, ARTICLE 37: PROHIBITION OF TORTURE, DEATH 
PENALTY, LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY 6 (2006). 
 117. CRC, supra note 8. 
 118. Id. art. 37(b). 
 119. As discussed in Part I, supra, many scholars are of this view. See D’AMATO, supra note 
31, at 160; BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 12–13. 
 120. See Weisburd, supra note 21, at 29. 
 121. CRC, supra note 8, art. 2(2). 
 122. Id. art. 4. 
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provides for monitoring and sanctioning violations of the obligations imposed 
within it beyond the state-to-state model contemplated by Weisburd.  Article 
45 allows the Committee on the Rights of the Child123 to invite 
nongovernmental organizations and other United Nations organs to report on 
the implementation of the Convention.124  Through investigation and reporting, 
these organizations can play an important role in enforcing the obligations of 
states under the CRC.125  Taken together, the express prohibition of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of release in Article 37(a), the obligations 
imposed on state parties to enforce the rights guaranteed in the CRC, and the 
role of nongovernmental organizations in monitoring state compliance with the 
CRC show that this treaty imposes a legal duty on states.  Thus, the 
Convention provides strong evidence that states avoid sentencing juveniles to 
life without parole out of a sense of legal obligation, satisfying the opinio juris 
element of customary international law. 
Although the provision of the CRC prohibiting life imprisonment without 
the possibility of release for juvenile offenders is itself sufficient to establish 
opinio juris, the drafting history of the CRC and the widespread ratification of 
it provide further evidence that states prohibit life without parole out of a sense 
of legal obligation.  The drafting of the CRC began in 1979,126 and the 
prohibition of life imprisonment was first proposed in 1986.127  The 1986 
proposal stated, in relevant part, “State parties shall, in particular, ensure 
that: . . . [c]apital punishment or life imprisonment is not imposed for crimes 
committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”128  Notably, the draft 
referred to “life imprisonment” in general, without any reference to the 
possibility of parole or release.129  The representative of Japan expressed 
concern over the reference to life imprisonment, indicated that his delegation 
would not agree to the prohibition of it, and suggested deletion of the entire 
provision.130  The Canadian representative then suggested qualifying the 
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prohibition with the words “without the possibility of release.”131  The 
representative of the United States indicated that her delegation disagreed with 
the entire reference to capital punishment and life imprisonment, and focused 
her remarks on the reference to persons below eighteen years of age.132  The 
Working Group concluded its discussion of life imprisonment by adding the 
phrase “without the possibility of release” to the draft under discussion.133 
In 1989, the Working Group resumed consideration of life imprisonment.  
The Working Group had before it the text adopted at the first reading, which 
provided, “having regard to the relevant provisions of international 
instruments, the States Parties to the present Convention shall, in particular, 
ensure that: . . . capital punishment or life imprisonment without possibility of 
release is not imposed for crimes committed by persons below 18 years of 
age.”134  The Working Group also had before it a proposal of Venezuela, which 
did not specifically address life imprisonment.135  After a general debate over 
the first reading text and the Venezuela proposal, “in which it became obvious 
that there was a total lack of consensus,” the Chairman of the Working Group 
appointed an open-ended drafting group, of which the United States was a 
participant, to coordinate with Venezuela.136  The drafting group was able to 
submit a new proposal, which stated, “[n]either capital punishment nor life 
imprisonment [without possibility of release] shall be imposed for offences 
committed by persons below 18 years of age.”137  The representative of 
Portugal introduced the coordinated proposal by indicating that: 
the drafting group had endeavored to draw up a text consistent with the 
instruments adopted in this field by the United Nations, dividing the various 
independent situations which required protection into two articles.  The new 
article 19 therefore covered situations such as the prohibition of torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the death penalty 
or life imprisonment.138 
In discussing the coordinated proposal, the representatives of Austria, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Senegal, and Venezuela suggested that the 
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bracketed language, “without the possibility of release,” be deleted.139  The 
representatives of China, India, Japan, Norway, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, and the United States argued that the language should be 
retained.140  Seeking to achieve consensus, the representatives of China, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and Venezuela suggested that 
the entire reference to life imprisonment be deleted, a suggestion opposed by 
the representative of Senegal.141  Finally, the delegations that had proposed 
deletion of the phrase “without the possibility of release” agreed to retain the 
words.142  In the end, the Working Group adopted a provision saying that 
“[n]either capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of 
release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below 18 years of 
age.”143 
The drafting history of what would become Article 37(a) of the CRC is 
important for several reasons.  First, the history reveals the importance 
attached to the prohibition on life imprisonment of juvenile offenders by some 
delegations.  In the 1989 discussions, there was “a total lack of consensus”144 
over the Venezuela proposal, which was silent on life imprisonment, and the 
draft adopted at the first reading, which prohibited life imprisonment without 
the possibility of release.  Even after a consequent redrafting of the provision 
on juvenile justice, the prohibition on life imprisonment remained.145  Further, 
the most intense debate over the life imprisonment provision concerned not the 
inclusion of language prohibiting the sentence itself, but rather the inclusion of 
the limiting phrase “without the possibility of release.”146  The focus of the 
discussions in the drafting process indicates that the prohibition on life 
imprisonment was accepted as necessary and important to the drafters of the 
CRC. 
Second, the drafting history reveals that the prohibition on life 
imprisonment was meant to reflect existing international law.  As the 
representative from Portugal indicated, the drafters considered the prohibition 
of life imprisonment to be consistent with previous instruments adopted by the 
United Nations.  This perception, even while disputed by commentators,147 
indicates that the statement on life imprisonment was intended to be 
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declarative of existing law, like the treaty provisions accepted as evidence of 
customary international law in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.148  The 
drafters’ explanation that the prohibition on life without parole reflected 
previous international agreements makes Article 37(a) strong evidence of the 
sense of legal obligation required under opinio juris. 
In addition to the history of the CRC, the widespread ratification and 
acceptance of the treaty provides evidence of opinio juris.  According to 
Cynthia Price Cohen, who participated in the drafting of the CRC, “the [CRC] 
has received precedent-setting global support.”149  Compared with previous 
United Nations human rights treaties, more nations participated in the signing 
ceremony on the day the CRC was opened for signature, more nations have 
ratified the CRC, and the CRC went into force in the least amount of time.150  
In short, “[n]ot even the [CRC]’s most enthusiastic supporters could have 
predicted the extent to which it has been embraced by the international 
community or the speed with which it has become a legally binding treaty.”151  
There are currently 192 parties to the CRC.152  Only the United States and 
Somalia are not parties, although both states are signatories.153  No state has 
registered a reservation to the prohibition on life imprisonment without the 
possibility of release in Article 37(a).154 
The drafting history of the CRC and the near-universal ratification of it 
produce “strong law-creating effect” under Brownlie’s explanation of law-
making treaties.155  Brownlie states that “the number of parties, the explicit 
acceptance of rules of law, and, in some cases, the declaratory nature of the 
provisions produce a strong law-creating effect . . . .”156  All but two states in 
the world are parties to the CRC, the drafters of the CRC expressed that the 
prohibition on life without parole was consistent with prior United Nations 
agreements, and Article 37 declares that states shall ensure that life 
imprisonment without the possibility of release is not imposed on juvenile 
offenders.  Therefore, the prohibition on life without parole in the CRC has 
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strong law-creating effect and is strong evidence that states refrain from 
sentencing juveniles to such sentences under a sense of legal obligation.  On 
the basis of Article 37 of the CRC itself, as well as with consideration of the 
drafting history and the number of state parties to the treaty, the opinio juris 
element of the norm prohibiting life without parole for juvenile offenders is 
satisfied.  Because the state practice element of this norm is also satisfied, 
customary international law prohibits the imposition of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders, and this prohibition is 
binding on all states. 
III.  THE PROHIBITION ON LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES FOR MINORS IS 
BINDING ON THE UNITED STATES: THE UNITED STATES IS NOT A PERSISTENT 
OBJECTOR 
Customary international law prohibits the sentencing of juvenile offenders 
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.157  The United States is 
bound by this rule unless it can prove that it has opted out under the persistent 
objector doctrine.158  As discussed in Part I, supra, the United States must have 
objected when the rule was in its nascent stage and continued to object 
afterwards, and its objection must be consistent.159 
Before determining whether the United States objected to the rule 
prohibiting life without parole for juvenile offenders when it was in its nascent 
stage, it is necessary to identify when the norm crystallized into customary 
international law.  There is strong evidence that the norm developed during the 
drafting of the CRC and crystallized in 1990, when the CRC entered into 
force.160  The speed with which the CRC took legal effect and the number of 
states that signed the day it was opened for signature161 indicate that the 
practice of states was sufficiently uniform and the sense of legal obligation was 
present for the prohibition of life without parole for juvenile offenders to be a 
matter of customary international law when the CRC entered into force.  At the 
very latest, the norm crystallized into customary international law in 2002, 
when the United Nations Commission on Human Rights began adopting 
resolutions urging states to ensure that juvenile offenders not be sentenced to 
life imprisonment without the possibility of release.162  The condemnation of 
life imprisonment in 2002 and in subsequent resolutions163 provides evidence 
that a prohibition of this sentence was accepted as a norm of international law 
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by that year.  Given the lack of explicit and consistent objection to the norm by 
the United States, however, the United States does not qualify as a persistent 
objector regardless of when the norm crystallized into customary international 
law. 
Loschin suggests a five-step model to determine whether a state should be 
bound by a norm of customary human rights law.164  Application of this model 
to the norm prohibiting life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders shows that the United States should not be allowed to opt 
out under the persistent objector doctrine. 
A. Is the United States Bound by a Treaty or is the Norm Peremptory? 
Before analyzing the customary norm and the United States’ objection to 
it, it is necessary to determine whether a treaty obligation binds the United 
States and whether the norm is a peremptory one.165  The CRC is the only 
international instrument to explicitly prohibit life without parole for juvenile 
offenders.166  Because the United States has not ratified this treaty, it is not 
bound by it.167  The United States is bound by the CCPR, which contains 
general language implicating life without parole for juveniles.168  However, the 
CCPR is probably not sufficiently specific to bind the United States to a 
prohibition on life without parole for juvenile offenders absent a rule of 
customary international law.  Likewise, the norm is not peremptory because it 
has not achieved the status of jus cogens.  Few human rights norms have been 
so universally accepted that they are conclusively binding on all states,169 and 
the prohibition on life without parole for juvenile offenders concededly is not 
among them. 
B. Nature of the Norm Prohibiting Life without Parole Sentences for Juvenile 
Offenders 
Because neither treaty obligations nor jus cogens conclusively determine 
whether the United States is obligated to prohibit life without parole for 
juvenile offenders, the next step is to determine the history and substance of 
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the norm prohibiting life imprisonment of juvenile offenders.170  The relevant 
factors are whether “the norm emerge[d] over a long period of time, providing 
ample opportunity for the state to object, or was . . . an ‘instant norm’ that 
arose due to . . . a multilateral treaty;” and whether “the norm affect[s] . . . the 
quality of life of all citizens . . . or is . . . a specific rule that affects just a 
few . . . under specific circumstances.”171  The norm prohibiting life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole may be an instant norm under 
Loschin’s analysis in that it probably crystallized with the adoption of the 
CRC.172  However, the drafters of the CRC considered the prohibition on life 
imprisonment to be consistent with previous human rights instruments,173 
suggesting that the norm did not arise suddenly.  Further, even if the norm 
crystallized quickly, the United States had ample opportunity to object during 
its development.  The United States was heavily involved in the drafting 
process of the CRC,174 and could have objected to the norm during the several 
year drafting process of Article 37(a). 
With respect to the importance of the norm prohibiting life without parole 
for juvenile offenders, although the prohibition does not affect the quality of 
life of all citizens because not all children will be subjected to the criminal 
judicial system, the norm is still important.  The special needs of juveniles are 
widely recognized by commentators,175 human rights organizations,176 and the 
CRC.177  Also, the speed with which the CRC became a legally binding treaty 
and the “precedent-setting global support”178 for it suggests that the norms 
contained within the CRC are important to the state parties. 
C. Nature of the United States’ Objection 
The next step in determining whether the United States is bound by the 
rule of customary international law prohibiting life imprisonment without the 
possibility of release for juvenile offenders is to consider the quality and 
quantity of the United States’ objection, with reference to the forms the 
objection has taken, whether domestic legislation or court decisions are 
consistent with the objection, whether there are internal indications that the 
United States has changed position on the issue, and how long the United 
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States has objected to the rule.179  Generally, “louder” forms of objection that 
explain the objector’s position are more likely to qualify as persistent objection 
than passive and ambiguous statements or objection in the form of silence.180  
Also, “[t]he state must object during the formative stage of the norm to qualify 
as a persistent objector.”181 
1. Form of the United States’ Objection 
To the extent that the United States has objected to the norm prohibiting 
life without parole for juvenile offenders, its objection has taken the form of 
passive and ambiguous statements.  To understand the nature of the United 
States’ objection, it is necessary to examine its role in drafting the CRC in 
general and Article 37(a) in particular.  The United States was very active in 
the drafting process of the CRC, both in proposing new articles and in 
influencing the textual editing of almost every article.182  Indeed, “U.S. 
influence was so strong that some people referred to the [CRC] as the ‘U.S. 
child rights treaty.’”183  The debate over the text of Article 38, dealing with 
children and armed conflict, illustrates the influence of the United States in the 
consensus-focused drafting process of the CRC.  In reviewing the text adopted 
at the first reading, one state proposed increasing the minimum age for 
participation in combat from fifteen years to eighteen years.184  The United 
States opposed this suggestion, and the disagreeing delegations deliberated for 
several days.185  Although a majority of the states agreed to increase the 
minimum age to eighteen years, the United States delegation persistently 
refused to agree to this change.186  Ultimately, “[s]ustained U.S. opposition to 
this deviation . . . resulted in the adoption of fifteen as the minimum age for 
participation in combat.  A single delegation had prevented this text from being 
adopted, even though all other delegations were in complete agreement.”187  
Clearly, the consensus process gave the United States power to insist that 
certain rights not be included in the CRC, and the United States was willing to 
exercise this power. 
In contrast to the United States’ role in influencing the language and 
protections in Article 38, the United States did not exert its power to prevent 
the prohibition on life without parole in Article 37(a).  The first discussions of 
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life imprisonment took place in 1986.188  While the representative of Japan 
indicated that his delegation would not go along with the prohibition on life 
imprisonment in the draft under discussion and proposed its deletion,189 the 
representative of the United States merely expressed her delegation’s 
disagreement with the entire subsection under discussion.190  Specifically, she 
argued that the reference to “‘persons below eighteen years of age’ was too 
arbitrary and proposed its deletion.”191  In response to statements by observers 
from Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists that 
eighteen years was the age accepted in various international instruments, the 
United States representative said that: 
the United States . . . did not consider subparagraph (b) as drafted to be an 
appropriate general rule but that she would not insist on her amendment and 
block consensus, provided it was understood that the United States maintained 
its right to make a reservation on this point and that it was implicitly 
understood that a child committing an offence which, if committed by an adult, 
would be criminal could be treated as an adult.192 
Although the representative of the United States challenged the subsection 
containing a prohibition on life imprisonment, she focused her remarks on the 
minimum age and not on the prohibition on life imprisonment itself. 
Again, in 1989, the United States delegation expressed general opposition 
to the subsection containing the prohibition on life imprisonment, but did not 
expressly oppose the reference to this sentence.  Although the United States 
representative argued for retention of the words “without the possibility of 
release,”193 the United States was not among the four states that suggested that 
the entire reference to life imprisonment be omitted from the paragraph under 
discussion.194  Just as in 1986, the United States representative reserved the 
right of his country to enter a reservation to the article prohibiting capital 
punishment and life imprisonment without the possibility of release for 
offences committed by persons below eighteen years, but did not express 
opposition to the reference to life imprisonment in particular.195 
The comments, proposals, and reservations of the United States delegation 
in the drafting process of Article 37 do not qualify as “loud” forms of objection 
sufficient to establish a claim of persistent objection.  While the United States 
wielded its power to block consensus in order to prevent a change in the 
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minimum age for combat,196 it did not take advantage of its power to insist on 
the deletion of the prohibition on life without parole for juvenile offenders.197  
Further, even the statement of the United States delegation reserving the right 
of the United States to enter a reservation to Article 37 did not explain and 
discuss the United States’ position.  The only specific explanation the United 
States’ delegation provided focused on the arbitrariness of the age of eighteen, 
not on the penalties prohibited.  The tremendous influence of the United States 
in the drafting of the CRC, which was so strong that some people referred to 
the CRC as the “U.S. child rights treaty,”198 shows that the United States had 
ample time and power to object to the prohibition on life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole.  Because the United States did not insist on the 
deletion of the prohibition, it did not persistently object to the developing 
norm.199 
The refusal of the United States to ratify the CRC also does not qualify as 
an objection to the norm prohibiting life imprisonment without the possibility 
of release for juvenile offenders.  As Loschin notes, “[s]ilence should be 
presumed acquiescence, not objection.”200  Although many commentators view 
Article 37(a) as one of the main obstacles to United States ratification of the 
CRC,201 refusal to ratify constitutes objection in the form of silence.  Because 
the White House has not submitted the CRC to the Senate, 202 there is little 
evidence of the President’s or the Senate’s positions on Article 37(a)’s 
prohibition on life without parole for juvenile offenders. 
Finally, the United States’ statements regarding the juvenile death penalty, 
which some commentators have argued constitute persistent objection with 
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respect to the norm prohibiting that sentence,203 do not qualify as persistent 
objection to the norm prohibiting life without parole.  Bradley outlines the 
statements, reservations, and positions articulated by the United States with 
respect to the juvenile death penalty since the 1970s.204  All of these objections 
are specific to the death penalty; none mentions life without parole.205  Further, 
the latter sentence was not yet heavily used at the time the United States most 
stringently opposed challenges to the juvenile death penalty.206  Therefore, it is 
unlikely that the United States was attempting to opt out of the norm 
prohibiting life without parole as well as the norm prohibiting capital 
punishment with its statements and reservations to the CCPR.  The United 
States’ purported objection to the norm prohibiting the juvenile death penalty 
does not allow it to opt out of the norm prohibiting life imprisonment for 
juvenile offenders. 
Overall, the United States has not engaged in “loud” forms of objection to 
the norm prohibiting life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders 
because it has repeatedly failed to explain and discuss its position. 
2. Consistency of Objection with Domestic Legislation and Court 
Decisions 
The existence of domestic legislation and court decisions consistent with 
an objection is another factor in the quality and quantity of a state’s 
objection.207  Although there is no clear statement of the United States’ 
objection to the norm under discussion, presumably the United States would 
assert its right to impose life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, 
regardless of the age of the offender.  The legislation and court decisions of the 
federal government and of the states are generally consistent with the United 
States’ objection.  Forty-two states allow juvenile offenders who are tried as 
adults to be sentenced to life without parole.208  Federal courts have upheld 
such sentences,209 and the United States Supreme Court has refused to review 
the constitutionality of them.210 
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3. Internal Indications that the United States has Changed Position 
Despite the widespread legislative and judicial acceptance of life without 
parole sentences for juvenile offenders within the United States, there has been 
some movement away from these sentences in recent years.  According to data 
gathered by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the number of 
youth offenders sentenced to life without parole in the United States peaked at 
152 in 1996 and has steadily declined since then.211  In 2000, the last year for 
which data is available, 91 juvenile offenders were sentenced to life without 
parole,212 a number that is less than sixty percent of the number sentenced in 
1996.  Of course, the decreased usage of life without parole sentences does not 
necessarily indicate that the United States has changed its position in terms of 
its right to sentence youth offenders to such sentences. 
4. Length of Time the United States has Objected 
The United States must have objected during the formative stage of the 
norm prohibiting life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders to qualify as a persistent objector.213  If the norm 
crystallized in 1990, when the CRC entered into force, the United States must 
have consistently objected during the drafting of the treaty.  As noted, the 
United States failed to insist on the deletion of the language referring to life 
imprisonment, despite its demonstrated ability to block revisions that had 
otherwise universal support, and did not explain its position on life 
imprisonment.  Therefore, the United States failed to make persistent, loud 
objections during the formation of the norm.  Even if the norm prohibiting life 
without parole for juvenile offenders did not crystallize until 2002, when the 
Commission on Human Rights began adopting resolutions urging states to 
ensure that juvenile offenders are not subject to that sentence, the United States 
failed to object during the formation of the norm.  The United States has not 
ratified the CRC and has not clearly expressed its objection to the norm 
prohibiting life without parole.214   
 
 211. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 3, at 32. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See Loschin, supra note 66, at 166. 
 214. The United States has not responded to the merits of a petition filed with the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights challenging mandatory sentences of life without parole 
for juvenile offenders.  Email from Cynthia Soohoo, Director, Bringing Rights Home Project, 
Columbia Law School, to author (Aug. 6, 2007, 09:12 CST) (on file with author).  On behalf of 
thirty-two juvenile offenders serving life without parole sentences in Michigan, the American 
Civil Liberties Union and the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan have filed a petition 
with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alleging that sentences of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders violate the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man’s right to special protection for children under 
Article VII; protection against cruel, infamous, or unusual punishment under Article XXVI; right 
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D. Balancing the Importance of the Norm and the Nature of the Objection 
The final step in the determination of whether the United States is bound 
by the norm prohibiting life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders is 
to balance the importance of the norm with the nature of the United States’ 
objection.215  As discussed above, the norm carries great importance in terms 
of the number of states that have followed it and the widespread acceptance of 
the special needs of juveniles.216  Also, the United States has had ample 
opportunity to challenge the norm (and to insist that it not be included in the 
CRC), but has failed to consistently, explicitly, and loudly object.  Unlike the 
United States’ long-standing and consistent objection to the norm prohibiting 
the juvenile death penalty, which some commentators argued was sufficient to 
allow the United States to opt out of the norm,217 the United States’ objection 
to the norm prohibiting life without parole for juvenile offenders is not 
sufficient to exempt the United States from this customary rule.  Balancing the 
importance of the norm and the nature of the United States’ objection, it is 
clear that the United States has failed to meet the high standard required to 
qualify as a persistent objector and opt out of the norm.218  Therefore, the 
United States is bound by the rule of customary international law prohibiting 
life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders. 
CONCLUSION 
The norm prohibiting life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 
for child offenders has become a matter of customary international law, and is 
binding on the United States.  This norm satisfies both the state practice and 
opinio juris requirements of customary international law.  The overwhelming 
number of states that do not impose this sentence in practice or allow it in their 
penal codes, statements by international human rights bodies, and an express 
provision prohibiting life without parole for juvenile offenders in the widely-
ratified CRC prove that there is widespread state practice in compliance with 
the norm.  Also, the provisions of the CRC are sufficient to show that states 
avoid sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole out of a sense of 
legal obligation.  The importance of the prohibition of this sentence and its 
 
to humane treatment under Article I; and guarantees of due process under Articles XVIII, XXIV, 
XXV, and XXVI.  Petition Alleging Violations of the Human Rights of Juveniles Sentenced to 
Life Without Parole in the United States of America, at 22–23 (submitted Feb. 21, 2007), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/images/asset_upload_file326_24232.pdf.  The United States’ 
response to this petition may provide an articulation of its position on the customary norm 
prohibiting life without parole sentences for juveniles. 
 215. Loschin, supra note 66, at 166. 
 216. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text. 
 217. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 15, at 520–35. 
 218. See Loschin, supra note 66, at 166. 
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consistency with existing law, both apparent in the legislative history of the 
CRC, and the near-universal ratification of the CRC provide additional 
evidence of opinio juris.  Regardless of the view of customary international 
law and the types of evidence accepted to establish it, the prohibition on life 
without parole for juvenile offenders has become a matter of customary 
international law. 
The United States is bound by this rule and cannot opt out under the 
persistent objector doctrine because it failed to consistently and explicitly 
object during the formation of the norm and has not consistently objected since 
the norm crystallized into customary international law.  Therefore, the United 
States is under an international legal obligation to stop sentencing child 
offenders to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and must 
conform its treatment of juvenile offenders to the treatment of children by the 
overwhelming majority of other nations in the world. 
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